"Who Will Judge the Many When the Game is Through?": Considering the Profound Differences Between Mental Health Courts and "Traditional"
Involuntary Civil Commitment Courts
INTRODUCTION
For forty years, we have known that involuntary civil commitment hearings are-in most jurisdictions-"charades." t When the Supreme Court noted, in Parham v. JR., that the average length of a civil commitment hearing ranged from 3.8 to 9.2 minutes, 2 the reaction of many
QUALITY OF COUNSEL AT TRADITIONAL CIVIL COMMITMENT

HEARINGS
If there has been any constant in modem mental disability law, "it is the near-universal reality that counsel assigned to represent individuals at involuntary civil commitment cases is likely to be ineffective."' 0 We knew [Vol. 41:937 this as the modem era began." We knew it when some courts (the case of Lessard v. Schmidtl 2 is the perfect example) started taking more seriously some of the other substantive and procedural rights of persons who were the subjects of such hearings.1 3 We knew it when so few states chose to follow the examples of New York, New Jersey, and a handful of other jurisdictions' 4 that legislatively created regularized, dedicated, specialized legal services offices whose primary job was to provide representation at such hearings. 15 We knew it when the first empirical research showed that most lawyers prepared much less for civil commitment cases than for other cases, many did not speak to clients before the hearing, and they "rarely 
cc/H LY9-N4MR]).
Also, in many U.S. jurisdictions, lawyers' caseloads are far too heavy to allow individualized representation. Years ago, a study in Chicago found that a single public defender was assigned to handle all civil commitment cases in the city of Chicago-a prohibitive case load of forty to sixty cases per week and 2,000-3,000 cases per year. See Elliott Andalman & David L. Chambers, Effective Counselfor Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 MIss. L.J. 43, 61 (1974) . When that study was replicated twenty years later, it found a caseload of 2,000 per year in another county (presumably in Florida). Beyond the scope of this paper is a consideration of an important collateral issue: that there are often not the community support services in place (e.g., housing and less restrictive alternative treatment facilities) that should be available to all who are subject to the involuntary civil commitment process. 
353-54 (2011).
There are also institutional pressures: The attorney who depends on the goodwill of others in the system (e.g., judges, state attorneys, or prosecutors) may pull his punches, even unwittingly, in order to retain credibility for future interactions (which he would put to use for his future clients). Judges want cases resolved.
Id.
21 What I have reported on here is all infinitely depressing, but it is not new; nor is the lack of interest in the subject matter new. The Scallet article-the first using the phrase "greased runway" in this context 7 -is nearly forty years old. Important pieces, such as Wexler's, 3 8 on the role of the state in this context have been cited only a handful of times. There has been no discernable impact of studies such as the one done by Parry and Turkheimer.
3 9 In short, in the nearly forty years since I started writing about this topic (a topic to which I continue to return), 40 very little has changed in the context of involuntary civil commitment trials. They remain, in the words of the eminent forensic psychiatrist Paul Appelbaum, the "disfavored stepchild in the large family of concerns that must be addressed by the justice system." 4 1
I.
THE PROMISE OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS
However, consider next the parallel universe of MHCs.
4 2 There is no question that one of the most important developments in the past two decades in the way that criminal defendants with mental disabilities are treated in the criminal process has been the creation and expansion of MHCs, one kind of "problem-solving court." 43 The creation of these courts is particularly critical as we-tardily-begin to come to grips with the ways that persons with mental disabilities are disproportionately arrested for "nuisance crimes" and the significance of MHCs grows.
4 4 There is a wide range of dispositional alternatives available to judges in these cases 45 and an even wider range of judicial attitudes. 46 And the entire concept of MHCs is certainly not without controversy.
7
There is no question, however, that MHCs offer a new approachperhaps a radically new approach-to the problems at hand. 48 They 41. Appelbaum, supra note 36, at 66 (as quoted in Gordon, supra note 31, at 678). Although there is no single prototype, virtually all MHCs include a special docket handled by a particular judge, with the primary goal of diverting defendants from the criminal justice system and into treatment. 5 6 MHCs are premised on team approaches; 57 representatives from justice and treatment agencies assist the judge in screening offenders to determine whether they would present a risk of violence if released to the community, devising appropriate treatment plans, and supervising and monitoring the individual's performance in treatment. 58 The MHC judge functions as part To serve effectively in this sort of court setting and to best achieve 62th jug the objectives of these courts, the judge needs to develop enhanced interpersonal skills and awareness of a variety of psychological techniques to persuade the individual to accept treatment and motivate him or her to participate effectively in it. 6 3 The judge must be able to build trust and manage risk. [W]ith the assistance of team members-including the public defender, prosecutor, and behavioral and mental health specialists-the judge performs the following three tasks: (1) he conducts a risk assessment in which he evaluates the defendant's potential to harm himself and the public; (2) he evaluates and implements a treatment plan designed to manage and reallocate the defendant's risk; and (3) he monitors the risk over a period of time, often requiring frequent return visits by the defendant. These skills include the ability to convey empathy and respect, communicate effectively with the individual, listen to what the individual has to say (thereby fulfilling the individual's need for voice and validation), earn the individual's trust and confidence, and engage in motivational interviewing and various other techniques designed to encourage the individual to accept treatment and comply with it.
Id.
60.
6 5 Judges in such courts must have the capacity to "break free from the statutory shackles that 'transformed them into mid-level bureaucrats."' 66 It is also far more likely that these judges will be culturally competent and thus able to "unpack" the testimony of persons subject to civil commitment who do not come from the mainstream culture. 6 7 These courts provide "nuanced" approaches 68 and may signal a "fundamental shift" in the criminal justice system. 69 According to former Judge Randal Fritzler, a successful mental health court thus needs: (1) a therapeutic environment and dedicated team; (2) an environment free from stigmatizing labels; (3) opportunities for deferred sentences and diversion away from the criminal system; (4) the least restrictive alternatives; (5) decision-making that is interdependent; (6) coordinated treatment, and (7) a review process that is meaningful. 94-95 (2003) . Successful judges in MHCs will typically demonstrate a sort of "charismatic authority," seen by Professor Castellano as "an essential element of judges' ability to achieve the complex tasks of building trust and managing risk among chronic reoffenders." Castellano, supra note 43, at 402; see also Fisler, supra note 55 (discussing the backgrounds of the first problemsolving court judges in New York). See generally Talesh, supra note 59. Looking specifically at the database that has developed around Judge Lemer-Wren's court, I have sought to rebut the argument that mental health court judges are "too dependent on the aura of the charismatic judge" in Perlin, Cast Your Robe, supra note 42, at 20. Professor Ursula Castellano has thoughtfully and insightfully argued that for MHCs to be successful, the presiding judge need practice what she calls "the politics of benchcraft," 8 ' rising "to the larger challenges embedded in the alternative courtroom." 8 2 Such judges "selectively apply, blend and transform" elements from the treatment and legal spheres to adjudicate cases therapeutically and to "generate more effective solutions." 8 3 In this context, it should be noted that studies of the MHCs referred to here conclude that such courts actually work as they are intended to.
See
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Participants in Judge Ginger Lerner-Wren's MHC had significantly lower arrest rates after enrollment in treatment programs than before enrollment and lower post-enrollment arrest rates than comparison groups; in fact, MHCs evaluated in a multi-site study 85 "were more successful at reducing recidivism-recidivism rates of 25% versus 10/o-15%"-than were drug courts. 86 And these statistics are constant when juvenile MHCs are studied. Research also suggests that mental health court participation increases access to and utilization of mental health care, 88 reduces the use of crisis or high-intensity services, and reduces substance use. 89 The most recent relevant study-authored by a sitting trial judge-has thus concluded that " [p] [Vol. 41:937 supervise criminal defendants in the community who present with high needs and a high risk to re-offend absent intervention."
90
A.
From the Perspective of Procedural Justice
Consider both these court systems in the context of procedural justice.
9
' "Procedural justice" asserts that "people's evaluations of the resolution of a dispute (including matters resolved by the judicial system) are influenced more by their perception of the fairness of the process employed than by their belief regarding whether the 'right' outcome was reached." 9 2 The research is consistent: "[T]he principal factor shaping [the] reactions [of the general public] is whether law enforcement officials exercise authority in ways that are perceived to be fair." 9 3 And, the fairness of the process used to reach a given outcome is critical to perceptions of legitimacy. 9 4 The question to be asked is this: does the criminal justice system treat defendants fairly and respectfully regardless of the substantive outcome reached? When those affected by decision-making processes perceive the process to be just, "they are much more likely to accept the outcomes of the process, even when the outcomes are adverse."
96 Professor Tom Tyler's groundbreaking research has taught us that individuals with mental disabilities, like all other citizens, are affected by such process values as participation, dignity, and trust, and that experiencing arbitrariness in procedure leads to "social malaise and decreases people's willingness to be integrated into the polity, accepting its authorities and following its rules." 9 7 "There is a growing body of research showing that the experience of procedural justice not only enhances evaluations of persons, institutions, and specific outcomes, but also leads to greater overall satisfaction with the legal experience and more positive affect with respect to an encounter with the justice system." 98 Perceptions of systemic fairness are driven, in large part, by "the degree to which people judge that they are treated with dignity and respect." 99 (noting that increasing a patient's "sense of participation, dignity, and trust" during a civil commitment proceeding will "increase his or her acceptance of the outcome of the hearing"). justice-whether the criminal justice system treats defendants fairly and respectfully regardless of the substantive outcome reached--determines the public's willingness to engage in and comply with the system."
E. ALLAN LIND
100
The procedural justice differences between traditional civil commitment courts-dark, "greased runways" with disinterested judges and lawyers' 0 1 -and modem MHCs-dignity-enforcing and coercionavoiding-could not be starker.' 0 2 In a thoughtful article about the role of procedural justice in the civil commitment process, Brian McKenna and his colleagues note "the clinical and ethical importance of procedural justice principles in the enactment of civil commitment," stressing that "these principles involve allowing patients to have their say, listening to them seriously, providing patients with information and treating them with concern, fairness and respect."' The late Professor Bruce Winick has observed that "[p]erhaps nothing can threaten a person's belief that he or she is an equal member of society as much as being subjected to a civil commitment hearing" and, in this context, when "legal proceedings do not treat people with dignity, they feel devalued as members of society."' 
B.
From the Perspective of Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Consider next both these court systems in the context of therapeutic jurisprudence. 0 7 Therapeutic jurisprudence presents a model for assessing the impact of case law and legislation, recognizing that, as a therapeutic agent, the law can have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences. "The ultimate aim of therapeutic jurisprudence is to determine whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due process principles."' 0 8
In the context of this paper, consider the impact of therapeutic jurisprudence specifically in the context of (1) the extent to which "legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due process area." Perlin, Could Be Your Funeral, supra note 10, at 246. Recently, however, this case-which had found that the "adequacy of counsel" standard established by the U.S. Supreme Court for criminal cases was inadequate for civil commitment cases-was partially overruled in Matter ofJS., 401 P.3d 197 (Mont. 2017), calling for adherence to the Strickland standard. THERAPEUTIC AGENT, supra note 7, at 245, 251-58. 1 discuss these insights, inter alia, in Perlin, supra note 20, at 742. On how formal hearings may force individuals before the court to "face reality," see principles,"' 09 (2) how the law "actually impacts people's lives," 1 o (3) whether the court system supports an "ethic of care,""' and (4) the extent to which the legal system abides by the "three Vs" articulated by Professor Amy Ronner: voice, validation, and voluntariness.1 2 It is important to note that in his analysis of these issues, Professor Winick considered both individuals' emotional life and psychological well-being. 113 I am struck with an anomaly that is at the core of this paper: civil commitment courts are-virtually across the board-the antithesis of therapeutic jurisprudence, in stark contrast to the TJ-modeling MHCs of the sort presided over by Judge Wren (and others, e.g., Judge Matthew D'Emic in Brooklyn"l 4 and Judge Michael Finkle in Seattle's). MHCswhen structured properly and when chaired by a judge who "buys into" the TJ model-are perfect exemplars of the practical utility of therapeutic jurisprudence." 1 6
As one commentator has noted, therapeutic jurisprudence "has expanded the role of courts to include a rehabilitative process."'1
The promotion and creation of such courts are consistent with TJ's aims and aspirations,' 8 especially where litigants are given the "voice" that TJ demands."
9 The courts are grounded 1 2 0 and rooted'21 in TJ; they reflect TJ "theory in practice;" 2 2 and they acknowledge that a defendant's appearance in such a court comes at a "painful and crucial point in life." 2 3
But these TJ-friendly, TJ-inspiring, and TJ-enforcing courts-courts that, better than any others, provide an environment that is not stigmatizing and not sanistl
In a book and in a series of recent papers, I have focused on the need for dignity in the legal process in cases involving persons with mental disabilities.1 2 6 One of the central principles of TJ is a commitment to dignity.1 2 7 With my colleagues, Keri Gould and Deborah Dorfman, I have concluded that " [t] he perception of receiving a fair hearing is therapeutic because it contributes to the individual's sense of dignity and conveys that he or she is being taken seriously." 2 8 In a recent article about dignity and the civil commitment process, Professors Jonathan Simon and Stephen Rosenbaum embrace therapeutic jurisprudence as a modality of analysis and focus specifically on this issue of voice: "When procedures give people an opportunity to exercise voice, their words are given respect, decisions are explained to them their views taken into account, and they substantively feel less coercion."
29 With my colleague Naomi Weinstein, I have recently argued that "attorneys must embrace the principles and tenets of therapeutic jurisprudence as a means of best ensuring the dignity of their clients and of maximizing the likelihood that voice, validation and voluntariness 1o will be enhanced."' 3 ' I believe that rejecting the traditional civil commitment court model and embracing the modem mental health court model is the single-best way that this dignity can be provided.1 32
III. CONCLUSION
There are other issues to consider as well. Although a robust literature has developed about MHCs, and although researchers have begun to focus on a broad-range of empirical issues, such as the extent to which defendants are competent to waive their trial rights in such settings, the quality of counsel, the significance of diversion, etc.,' 3 1 there is still virtually nothing in the legal literature on these precise questions in this context.1 3 4 Bruce Winick has sketched the outlines of what lawyers must do in the representation of clients in these courts,' 3 5 but little scholarly attention has been given to a range of important issues that affect the operation of these courts and the role of lawyers representing clients in them.' 3 6 Even a TJ-centric court will only be able to do so much if we do not take seriously questions as to the adequacy of counsel in this specific context. For it is fair process norms, such as the right to counsel, that "operate as substantive and procedural restraints on state power to ensure that the individual suspect is treated with dignity and respect." 13 7 And if this right is ensured, then and only then will courts administering civil commitment proceedings live up to their potential.
The title of this paper draws on Bob Dylan's song, Ring Them Bells,1 3 8 and is found in the fourth line of this stanza:
Ring them bells for the blind and the deaf Ring them bells for all of us who are left Ring them bells for the chosen few Who will judge the many when the game is through 39 Here, Dylan sings of the bells ringing for others with disabilities ("the blind and the deaf') and those who are outsiders ("us who are left"). According to the preeminent Dylanologist Oliver Trager, the song "ach[es] with compassion,"40 and I think that is appropriate for use in this paper. Therapeutic jurisprudence "ach[es] with compassion." Traditional civil commitment courts make me ache with sadness. I am hoping that some of the TJ spirit that imbues successful MHCs will eventually be 135. For a valuable recommendation as to what attorneys should do in such circumstances, see Perlin, Wisdom Is Thrown, supra note 134, at 369-70 (quoting Stefan & Winick, supra note 61, at 511, 517, 520). Professor Winick made the following comments: "Lawyers should adequately counsel their clients about the advantages and disadvantages of accepting diversion to mental health court . . . . As a result, judges and defense counsel in mental health courts should ensure that defendants receive dignity and respect, [and] are given a sense of voice and validation." Id. at 516, 523.
136. On other important questions raised about the use of MHCs, see Canada, Halloran & Peters, supra note 89, at 58-59 (discussing whether the low numbers of such courts means that they play "no more than a niche role" in the criminal justice/mental health system; whether admission into such courts "prioritize[s] and privilege[s]" some defendants over others; whether lack of additional resources will lead such courts into becoming "a dangerous extension of state authority"; whether court gatekeepers are rigorous in clearly identifying who should be included and who should be excluded from such courts; and whether justice and therapy are ultimately incompatible, a question that the authors readily concede "may be as unresolvable as it is unlikely to disappear").
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